The public administration in Poland is constantly extending and improving electronic services provided to citizens, business and itself (e.g. one ministry providing services to another public administration institution). New expectations like integration using the multilateral interoperability model, the service oriented approach, different security categories and groups within different institutions are creating the requirement for the appropriate security model. According to the authors current models do not meet the new requirements, but can be used as a base for the new approach. The lattice and its variations in different models (Denning, Sandhu, Szafrański) was selected by authors to create the new electronic services security management model for integration platforms which are supporting realization of public tasks. This publication focuses on practical aspect of the new model and presents the case study on a public administration e-services example. Detailed definition of the model itself can be found in previous authors' articles.
Introduction
Over the last decade new approach to information processing in IT systems has become almost obligatory -change from the data oriented to the service oriented architecture. New architecture has brought new systems like cloud solutions and integration platforms together with new challenges.
One of them is a security management, which according to the authors is not keeping up with rapid changes. Data oriented models are still used for composite services security which is constantly leading to more complex to manage solutions. Current most popular models (fifteen models were analysed in previous author's research [1] ) do not meet the new requirements.
In previous authors' publication [2] the Service Oriented Architecture, interoperability models and requirements for new security approach together with the new model proposition was presented.
This article discusses case studies of authors' information security model for service oriented systems used in public administration. It also consists of basic introduction to the proposed model and comparison to the approach used nowadays.
Authors' decision to focus on public administration services and electronic platforms was explained in previous publication [3] . The main reason is the observed problem with public e-services integration using the multilateral interoperability model. The lack of good security model is slowing down the rollout of new integrated public e-services with is impacting e-administration -State 2.0 [4] program in Poland.
The paper is organized as follows: first it defines the main components of author's model (section 2). Sections 3-6 presents case study of model usage. Section 3 is a case study introduction which focuses on the comparison of currently used solutions and the one presented by authors. Section 4 and 5 presents examples of data and execution management for atomic services and section 6 presents an example for data and execution management for composite services. In section 7, the conclusions of the paper are presented.
Main components of the proposed model
Although authors' model was explained in details in previous publications [1] , [5] , [6] it is necessary to define all basic parameters which are used in following case study. The authors' information security management model (SM) for integration platforms is built from data access management model and e-service execution management model. Security Management (SM) model for integration platforms consist of elements:
where:
• -a set of entities,
• -a set of data units,
• -a set of protection classes,
• -a set of operations,
• -a set of atomic electronic services,
• -a set of composite electronic services,
• -a set of categories of an authorized execution,
• ρ -an access relation,
• -a scope of operations relation,
• -a relation of an authorized service execution,
• -a set of restrictions functions (restrictions generator for the security management model).
Additionally, in the set of atomic electronic services there are services, which are called initial and are started by an authorized entity (object): ⊂ .
Data units (elements of set ) are described by data protection classes, which are members of set for example: public, confidential, secret, top secret. Electronic services are described by categories of an authorized execution, which are members of set -for example: universal, special, restricted.
Each entity from set P has the following parameters determining its access level:
• a protection class from the set,
• a range of an authorized operation from set -for example: reading,
• a category of an authorized execution from set. Detailed definition of a composite e-service from the set is provided in previous author's publication [1] -for the purpose of this article short introduction is provided.
• ⊂ -a set of atomic e-services being part of composite e-services,
• ∈ and ∈ -an initial e-service (placed on integration platform) which is also atomic e-service,
• -a function transforming enforcements into started atomic e-services (defined in details in [2] -not relevant for this article purpose),
• z -a function transforming atomic e-services into new enforcements (defined in details in [2] -not relevant for this article purpose). An access relation is built on pairs of protection classes: ρ ϲ × and determines the hierarchy of allowed accesses to the data -for example: top secret > secret > confidential > public. The symbol > describes the pair relation -for example: secret > confidential means that pair (secret, confidential) belongs to relation ρ. A scope of authorized operations relation is built on pairs of operations: ϲ × and defines a hierarchy of operations -for example: update > delete > write > read > search. Both relations meet requirements of the lattice theory, which allows building protection classes and operations lattices. It is allowed to build scope of operations on the combination of operation attributes changing the relation definition (like it is presented in the following example - Figure 2 ).
The entity is allowed to access the data unit using specific operations if the protection class of the entity and the protection class of the data unit satisfy the relation and the scope of operations of the data unit and the scope of the operation being performed satisfy relation.
Defined relations are generating lattices which implies that all elements have to meet all lattice theory requirements [7] . An access relation is generating a hierarchical lattice from the protection classes set. Figure 1 presents an example of a protection classes lattice (arrows define the relation ρ). Similar as in the Sandhu model [8] it is possible to extend the set of partially ordered with a maximal element (eg. "Syshigh" from Sandhu model) or a minimum (eg. "k0: uncategorized") so they satisfy conditions of the lattice. A scope of operations relation is generating a hierarchical lattice from the operations set Figure 2 presents an example of a scope of operations lattice based on Linux permissions (R: read, W: write, X: execute / access directory contents -(dash): additional symbol for no operation). In this case scope of operations is the combination of three operation attributes: ϲ 3 × 3 where:
In the proposed model execution is extracted from operations and applied only to services, so X should be interpreted only as an 'access directory contents' operation. A set of restrictions functions (restrictions generator for the security management model) was defined in details in previous authors' publication [1] as an access management and execution management restrictions functions. Additionally to already defined functions ( 1 to 7 from data access management model and 8 to 10 from e-service execution management model), there are three which are used for composite electronic services.
12 -function checks correctness of execution of atomic services within the composite e-service u.
The verification process iterates over all atomic e-services F being part of composite e-service u. It checks if the relation of an authorized service execution is satisfied (within 8 to 10 functions defined in previous author's publications [1] , [2] ). The sequence of all enforcements within an electronic service execution tree [1] is verified. The enforcement, which is starting a composite service has to be launched by the entity (user), all next enforcements are launched by electronic services. Function 12 enforces very strict security policy -not only the entity must have sufficient authority to enforce the service, but services which are launching other services are checked. As a result, this prevents the placement of e-services with higher execution category at the end of the composite service tree as the successor of a service with a lower category. It is possible to mitigate the presented strict policy through the use of a softer version of the model (adapted for practical use), where function 12 is verifying all enforcements only form the entity execution category level (practically in this case the entity execution category is checked with the highest execution category of atomic e-services F being part of composite e-service u).
13 -function to verify correctness of data processing and services execution (full security management model) for composite e-service u.
13 : × → {0,1} (6) 13 ( , ) = 11 ( , ) • 12 ( , ) where ∈ , ∈
From the point of view of the full security management model for composite services it only allowed to execute a composite electronic service if and only if conditions of two security models -data access security and service security, are met.
Case study -introduction
This section presents the case study of authors' model for a simple composite electronic service with atomic services originating from different domain platforms. The presented e-service is integrated on an integration platform which in this example can be "e-PUAP" (Electronic Platform of Public Administration Services) or "Source" (original name in Polish is "Źródło" -a system that is integrating public registers). Domain platforms for this example purpose are systems owned by different ministries (Ministry of Justice -e-service which has access to the National Court Register and the of Ministry of the Interior and Administration -e-service which has access to PESEL Register).
The composite e-service is allowing an official or citizen go get information if a person (based on PESEL) number was convicted or not. Each office / ministry has different IT systems, different security user groups and policies which makes it difficult to automatically define security management rules to access both e-services simultaneously (as a composite e-service). By default citizen can only request his own data but officials can check any citizen if needed (for internal administration processes). This means that for composite e-service execution security management system has to check access rights and access level (for example: read, write) to all atomic services and data entities originating from different systems.
Currently if there is no integrated services security model implemented usually a new access group is created for official who can execute the composite e-service. This means that:
• there is no automation in e-service integration (need of expert every time new integrated e-service is created or changed),
• new security groups are often created specifically for new integrated e-services,
• security compliance is not checked for every component in every integrated system. With use of the authors' model it is possible to create "super lattices" [6] access, execution and operations and then to process security management on integration platform according to calculations presented below.
Case study for integrated e-service is followed by examples for an atomic e-service for access and execution management models.
Data management security example atomic e-services
The protection classes lattice and the scope of the operations lattice are defined for this example purpose the same as on Figure 1 and 2.
Two users are analyzed
(who according to model are entities) with protection classes as indicated below:
The atomic service 1 , is forcing operations on two data units: 1 (read operation: R--) and R--RW- Considering the case of an entity 1 there will be two verifications when it tries to launch 1 service.
Verification of the access to all data units
within the service (iteration over all pairs of entity and data unit within e-service): General formula:
Case study example:
because pair ( , ) ∈ ρ (24)
General formula:
Scope of performed operation general formula:
because pair � 4 ( 1 , 1 ), 3 (
because pair ( −, −) ∈ (31) Entity 1 will be authorized to launch service 1 from the data security management perspective, because:
Similar verification is performed for the 2 entity, who obtains a negative result (denial of service execution 1 ), because it does not have sufficient protection class to initiate the flow of data between itself and a data unit 2 and at the same time does not have permission to perform any operations on the data unit 2 (as minimum it must have update rights):
Execution management security example -atomic e-services
is the scope of execution categories lattice as in the Figure 3 .
Two user 1 and 2 (called entities according to the model) have the following execution categories permissions:
The atomic electronic service 1 has the following execution category:
The first case is when an entity 1 tries to execute the 1 electronic service (security management system will perform following check). General formula:
pair ( , )
Entity 1 will be permitted to execute the service 1 from the e-services security management perspective.
The second case is when entity 2 tries to execute the 1 electronic service (security management system will perform following check).
The 1 entity obtains a negative result (denial of the 1 service execution), because it does not have sufficient execution permissions to launch the 1 service.
Data and execution management security example -composite e-services
The protection classes lattice , the scope of operations lattice and the scope of execution categories lattice are defined for this example purpose the same as on Figure 1, 2 and 3 .
, and are super-lattices created from domain systems lattices, which were defining security boundaries within one administration institution (for exampleministry).
Two users 1 i 2 have the following protection classes and execution security categories:
The composite electronic service 1 , analysed in this example, is graphically presented on Figure 5 . 
Data entities, used in the example, have the following protection classes:
The atomic service 1 is the initial service published on the integration platform (for example -"e-PUAP", 2 and 3 are e-services originating from different domain systems (for example: one is published by the Ministry of Justice and another by the Ministry of the Interior and Administration).
Following operations are defined to run on selected data units within the 1 composite electronic service: read operation 1 : R--, update operation 2 : RW-and write operation: 3 : R--.
Entity (user) 1 has access rights to all three data units with following operations level:
Entity (user) 2 has access rights only to 1 and 3 data units with following operations level and no access rights to 2 data unit:
When the user 1 is trying to launch 1 composite electronic service the security management system will perform verification as follows.
From the data and e-services security perspective:
The data security management part will be checked for every atomic electronic service and then for every operation and a data unit within the service. The result will be positive -all pairs are within the access or scope of operations relations.
The service security management can be divided into two cases: 
In this case although entity can execute initial service 1 the whole process will be blocked as 1 service is not permitted to launch 3 service.
• Soft version of the model:
In this case, the result will be positive, because the entity is entitled to launch all atomic services occurring within the composite service. Similar procedure will be performed when the 2 entity is trying to launch the composite service. It will end up with the negative result of the data security check due to inappropriate (too low) access and operations levels.
As proved on presented example, with use of authors' model:
• there is automation in e-service integration possible (maximum there is need of expert only one time during systems integration to supervise super-lattice creation [6] , e-services can be created and changed with automatic security level recalculation with use of presented verification schema),
• no need of new security groups (available security groups are integrated in super--lattices),
• security compliance can be checked for every component in every integrated system as they share common security schema defined with super-lattices.
Presented example is simple but integrated e-services can become very complex consisting of many electronic services from many different systems. Lack of well-defined security model for public integration platforms is a delaying factor in the development of this area of public administration.
Conclusions
This article presented only a small part of authors' research on the electronic services security for public administration, which can be found in already published and planned (in print or in review) papers.
The analysed theoretical example has to be tested on real environment of public administration in Poland in three steps: 1. Use and test cases have to be definedusing UML language. 2. The proposed theoretical model has to be tested on real life composite e-services (using modelling language). 3. The authors' model has to be implemented into tools used for e-services creation and modelling and tested by real integration platform administrators.
If all three steps are passed the proposed model can then be easily used by public administration to create the central management security system for integration platforms as an open standard. In the future, it can be extended with operational elements like:
• authentication mechanisms, This could allow to use the model with extensions to create a central security management for public administration instead of many domain systems (usually more than one security policy and system for each public institution -ministry, office, etc.).
